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Abstract
Defined in terms of a national security discourse, Britain’s 
asylum policy facilitates a disturbing dissociation of the 
asylum seeker from the identity of the refugee . The roots 
of this discourse can, this paper argues, be understood if 
the asylum seeker is seen as the site of a clash between 
two conceptualizations of political space—one that sees 
only the international state system, marked by the rights 
of sovereign states and exclusive political spaces, and one 
that sees a more complicated global political structure, 
marked by spaces of danger and of opportunity, in which 
human beings, as such, have a right to demand hospitality 
and inclusion from the state . Aiming to understand this 
clash, and the possibilities for moving beyond it, this paper 
analyzes British asylum policy through the lens of Michel 
Foucault’s account of sovereign biopower in Society Must 
Be Defended, read together with Giorgio Agamben’s work 
on the homo sacer and spaces of exception . These texts 
point towards the counter-narrative of the asylum seeker 
who refuses to disappear into discourses of national secur-
ity, and who suggests a “rival structure” of political space . 
Understanding this clash requires uncovering the violence, 
discernible in British asylum policy, which sustains the 
international state system and in doing so, creates and 
marginalizes the asylum seeker . This paper draws out the 
deeply challenging and complex nature of the “problem of 
asylum,” working against the simplification that a national 
security discourse imposes on the issue .
Résumé
Définie en termes de discours autour de la sécurité natio-
nale, la politique d’asile de la Grande Bretagne facilite la 
dissociation du demandeur d’asile de l’identité du réfugié . 
Cet article fait valoir que pour comprendre la racine de ce 
discours, il faut voir le demandeur d’asile comme le point 
de conflit entre deux conceptualisations de l’espace politi-
que — l’une qui ne voit que le système international com-
posé d’états caractérisé par les droits des états souverains 
et des espaces politiques exclusifs ; et l’autre qui voit une 
structure politique globale bien plus compliquée, marquée 
par des espaces de danger et d’opportunités, et où les êtres 
humains ont le droit de demander l’hospitalité et l’inclu-
sion de la part de l’état . Dans le but de comprendre ce 
conflit, et les possibilités de le dépasser, cet article analyse 
la politique du droit d’asile de la Grande Bretagne à tra-
vers les lentilles du compte-rendu du bio-pouvoir souverain 
par Michel Foucault dans Society Must Be Defended, lu 
de concert avec l’œuvre de Giorgio Agamden sur le homo 
sacer et les espaces d’exception .  Ces textes pointent vers 
la contre-narration du demandeur d’asile qui refuse de 
disparaître dans les discours sur la sécurité nationale, et 
qui au contraire propose une “structure rivale” d’espaces 
politiques . Pour comprendre ce conflit, il faut enlever la 
couverture cachant la violence qui peut être discernée dans 
la politique d’asile britannique, qui soutient le système 
international d’états et, ce faisant, crée et marginalise le 
demandeur d’asile . Cet article met à jour la nature profon-
dément difficile et complexe du « problème de l’asile », et 
s’insurge contre la simplification qu’un discours de sécurité 
national impose sur le problème .
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… we would know far more about life’s complexities if we applied 
ourselves to the close study of its contradictions instead of wast-
ing so much time on similarities and connections, which should, 
anyway, be self-explanatory . 
—José Saramago, The Cave
Introduction
There is something disturbing about the severity of the 
British reaction to asylum seekers. They are described as 
threats to national security, engendering increasingly strict 
border controls, are held in detention centres, are the focal 
point for xenophobic sentiments, and are generally assumed 
to be something other than refugees. This severity is also 
conspicuous in the protests of asylum seekers in Britain, 
especially among those who are detained, which take the 
form of hunger strikes, riots, escapes, and suicides. Such 
violence can be understood if the asylum seeker is seen as 
the site of a clash between two conceptualizations of polit-
ical space—one that sees only the international state system, 
marked by the rights of sovereign states and exclusive polit-
ical spaces, and one that sees a more complicated global pol-
itical structure, marked by spaces of danger and opportun-
ity, in which human beings, as such, have a right to demand 
hospitality and inclusion from the state.
Political space is not neatly defined in the way that the 
international state system suggests. It is chimerical and 
incoherent, shifting form depending on which activities 
and whose identities are recognized as political. Looking 
at political space from the perspective of a figure who finds 
him/herself on the margins of the international state system 
reveals both its instability and the violence with which its 
position of monopoly on political space is asserted. The asy-
lum seeker is one such figure. Along with the refugee, she/he 
emerges as “a figure of the ‘inter’—or in-betweeness—of the 
human way of being, as a figure of the ‘inter’ of international 
relations ….”1 The asylum seeker is one site at which the 
disciplining of the borders of the state and of identity takes 
place, and therefore at which the character of political space 
and identity is revealed and consequently also challenged.
Framed by Michel Foucault’s account of sovereign 
biopower in “Society Must Be Defended” read together with 
Giorgio Agamben’s work on the homo sacer and spaces of 
exception, this paper aims to uncover the violence, discern-
ible in British asylum policy, which sustains the global pol-
itical order and, in doing so, creates and marginalizes the 
asylum seeker. It draws out the contradictions that become 
obvious at the margins of this order, in the movements and 
claims of asylum seekers, and that suggest a “rival structure” 
of political space.2
The asylum regime, different from the refugee regime, 
brings a demand for refuge and recognition onto the 
territory of the state and is consequently more threaten-
ing and more directly subject to state efforts at control.3 
Asylum seekers are at odds with the international state 
system because of their generally clandestine movements 
across borders and because of their self-assertion, in the 
moment of demanding asylum from the state, as sovereign 
individuals and international political actors. The chal-
lenge implicit in their presence is countered by biopolitical 
maneuvering that sets them outside the nation, as a threat 
to national security. They are fit into the map of the inter-
national state system by being placed in a state of exception, 
where they can be understood according to Agamben’s 
description of the homo sacer—a life divested of all iden-
tity except that of being human, excluded from the space of 
rights and politics.4 The international state system is trad-
itionally assumed to be all encompassing, to regulate the 
lives of all people. In the case of asylum seekers, it can only 
do so by pushing them to the limits of the system, by mak-
ing them invisible. This violence must be hidden beneath a 
myth of civility; however the more assertive the violence, 
the more evident it, and the fragility of the system it sup-
ports, becomes. Asylum seekers themselves draw attention 
to it. Even from within a space of exception, they assert 
their presence as political subjects and thereby interrupt 
the discourses that attempt to define them. As objects of 
biopolitical control and exceptional measures, but also as 
political subjects, asylum seekers make visible a more com-
plicated picture of overlapping, divergent, and sometimes 
conflictive political spaces, identities, and narratives.
The challenge that the asylum seeker poses to the nor-
malcy and legitimacy of political space, as defined by the 
international state system, can be seen in three aspects of 
the relationship between this figure and the British state. It 
can be seen in the contradiction between the state’s roles of 
“making live” and “letting die,” evident in British asylum 
policy; in the language of emergency and establishment of 
a state of exception which, for the most part, constitute the 
reaction of Britain to asylum seekers and which reveal the 
challenge posed to the sovereign account of the political; 
and in the counter-narrative found in the asylum seeker who 
refuses to disappear into discourses of national security. 
The transformation of political space suggested by this chal-
lenge will be considered in the last section of the paper. This 
paper will first establish the background of the “problem of 
asylum,” looking at the asylum seeker as he/she appears in 
international law and United Nations (UN) declarations, 
and in British law and policy.
The Problem of Asylum
The asylum seeker enters the state as a spectre of a “migra-
tion crisis,” part of an imprecise category that is neither that 
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of the citizen nor that of the refugee, making claims based 
on international declarations of human rights in a space 
dedicated to citizen rights and already defined by the state 
as a threat. He/she is effectively unprotected by international 
ideas of obligation and legitimacy, which can act as a check 
on state behaviour. This ambiguous identity allows asylum 
seekers to be pushed to the obscure limits of national and 
international law, rights, and politics.
The transnational movement of asylum seekers is part 
of a larger trend of global migrations, which is eluding the 
control of governments and the international state system 
more generally and is proclaimed, by politicians across the 
political spectrum, to be unprecedented and menacing. 
International migration has grown dramatically in volume 
and scope since the Cold War and has had massive social 
and economic impacts, becoming a priority security con-
cern in domestic and international politics.5 These trends 
are framed as a crisis, generating harsh efforts to prevent 
unwanted immigration that have nevertheless proved imper-
fect, due to such factors as the demand for migrant labour 
and the difficulty of preventing such methods of entry as 
visa overstay and involvement with human traffickers.6 This 
lack of control augments the image of crisis—a “crisis” that 
will continue for as long as the pressures that drive people 
to move in search of work and refuge, such as conflict, eco-
logical degradation, and poverty, last. In Britain, the desire 
to “put migration at the heart of our foreign policy relation-
ships” places migration on par with the traditional issues of 
high politics, such as war and the national economy, and is 
demonstrative of this widespread unease.7
International agreements suggest that the asylum seeker 
has a right to request refuge from the state, but go no far-
ther. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
with the modifications adopted in the 1967 Protocol, defines 
the refugee as a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country ….”8 The UN defines the “asylum 
seeker” as someone who claims refugee status and is waiting 
for this claim to be decided by the state in which the claim is 
made. The UN, further, identifies many of the asylum seek-
ers who do not qualify as Convention refugees as “persons 
of concern” who are fleeing “serious threats to their life and 
liberty.”9 The position of the asylum seeker in relation to 
the state tends, however, to be neglected and the category 
of the asylum seeker to occupy a grey zone between refu-
gee and not-refugee. This is seen, for example, in the rules 
governing refugeeness, laid out by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which state explicitly 
that refugees must be neutral, apolitical, receptive of aid but 
not active.10 Asylum seekers transgress these rules as soon as 
they demand to be recognized as refugees, necessarily divid-
ing themselves from the category of the refugee.
Human rights documents that could be expected to speak 
to the position of those excluded from refugeehood demon-
strate an ambiguity that allows the asylum seeker to again 
slip from sight. The Declaration of Human Rights states 
that all humans “should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood” and that everyone “is entitled to a social 
and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”11 The 
alternative map of political space suggested in such state-
ments is, however, reconciled with the traditional map of 
the international state system through a series of moves that 
leave the asylum seeker largely unprotected by standards of 
international legitimacy. These include articles that provide 
for a state of emergency, allowing for derogation from the 
Bill for the public good, leaving the definition of an emer-
gency and the public good to the determination of states.12 
Ambiguity is also present in the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention, except in accordance with the law.13 The law of 
the state is left as the ultimate author of the political.
One of the defining characteristics of the state is control 
of the physical spaces in and through which one can legally 
move. The principle of asylum challenges this fundamental 
characteristic by granting another entity—the individual 
in search of asylum—the right to move onto the territory of 
the state. The asylum seeker falls into the space of ambigu-
ity described above when he/she asserts this right against 
the state. Asylum policy in Britain manifests as an issue of 
national security and public well-being. British policy docu-
ments and legislation relating to asylum therefore focus 
almost exclusively on deterrence and control rather than 
on humanitarianism, asylum, and rights. The current situa-
tion is described in crisis terms, with asylum seekers often 
framed as frauds, as something other than refugees and, 
sometimes, discursively coupled with “terrorists and others 
intent on harm.”14 This language of crisis is joined by that of 
exceptional measures. In 2002 it was announced that Tony 
Blair had taken over control of asylum policy and was con-
sidering, among other measures, deploying warships to fend 
off asylum seekers trying to reach Britain with the aid of traf-
fickers.15 The aggressive nature of this response has only aug-
mented since 2002 and is generally supported, and in turn 
conditioned, by public opinion and the British press.16
The language of the five-year strategy for asylum and 
immigration, entitled “Controlling Our Borders: Making 
Migration Work for Britain,” released by the Home Office 
in 2005, is oriented around policing, securing borders, 
and safeguarding the national interest, presenting asylum 
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seekers and others who enter illegally as a major threat that 
the Home Office is committed to dealing with.17 This strat-
egy includes increasing the number of failed asylum appli-
cants detained until it “becomes the norm that those who fail 
can be detained.” It also proposes to take a tougher stance 
on removals through, for example, making clear to the gov-
ernments of source countries that “failure to co-operate 
[by receiving failed asylum claimants] will have repercus-
sions.” Removals of principal asylum applicants increased 
by 237 per cent between 1996 and 2006, with the largest 
numbers removed to Iraq, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.18 This strategy, moreover, aims 
to minimize contact with asylum seekers in the first place, by 
“exporting … [British] borders around the world” with the 
aim of preventing asylum seekers from physically getting to 
British soil.19 Though numbers continue to fluctuate, there 
was a recent drop in the number of asylum seekers entering 
Europe more generally, but particularly in Britain, where the 
lowest yearly intake of asylum seekers since 1993 was experi-
enced in 2007. This is presented in the light of an achieve-
ment by the Home Office.20 Whether the toughening of the 
asylum system in Britain has prevented “fraudulent” asylum 
seekers or “legitimate” asylum seekers from entering Britain 
is not considered. A strategy that focuses on detention and 
removal, and that makes it more difficult to enter Britain 
to claim asylum, is indicative of a system oriented towards 
national security rather than humanitarian concerns.21
Defined by the state as a threat and a fraud, the asy-
lum seeker is distanced from the category of the refugee, 
allowing the state to approach the asylum seeker according 
to the imperatives of state security and sovereignty, rather 
than human security, without losing face internationally. 
British asylum policy displays the sovereign logic that works 
to recapture anomalies, netting them with categories that 
fit them into a map of sovereign nation-states. In the case of 
asylum seekers, this amounts to their disappearance as seek-
ers of asylum under definitions that mark them as threats to 
the nation.
Sovereign Contradictions
The democratic nation-state is Janus-faced, presenting the 
paternal face of protection to the nation and the harsh face 
of the sovereign to those excluded from it. The contradictory 
characters of these two faces are reconciled by the idea of 
their radical separation; however this idea is made vulnerable 
by the unreliability of anything “two-faced.” This tension is 
evinced in the state’s response to asylum, which advertises 
itself as building a wall of protection around the people who 
belong to the state. At the same time, it reveals the sovereign 
power of the state to which every citizen is bound, bringing 
to light the state’s dual role of threat and protector.
“Making Live” and “Letting Die”
A central myth of the modern nation-state describes it as 
a space of unity, order, and civility in which life is able to 
flourish, in contrast to the anarchical, violent, international 
space that lies outside its borders.22 The violence of exclu-
sion and exception, however, is required to manage the bor-
der between national unity and external threat, such that 
the state of nature where “anything can happen,” which is 
described as prior and external to the state, hides within it.23 
In order for the state to appear as the protector of life and 
order, this violence must disappear. The exclusion of the asy-
lum seeker from the space of politics and rights is one of the 
acts of state power that must be buried under other stories—
stories of “making live.”24
Foucault describes the political power operative within 
the modern democratic state as existing in three forms: 
sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower; or 
ultimate power vested in a sovereign entity by the people, 
normative power applied to the individual man-as-body 
[sic], and power applied to the collective body of man-as-
species [sic], to the population. More specifically, Biopower 
refers to the exercise of power to nurture and protect the 
life of the nation, through the regulation of collective polit-
ical and biological phenomena such as national identity and 
processes of birth, death, and production.25 The first and 
last forms of power conflict as sovereign power’s right over 
life and death, which is manifested as the right to “let live 
and make die,” gets tangled with biopower’s role of “making 
live and letting die.”26
In order to make biopower work in concert with sovereign 
power, Foucault tells us that state racism is needed.27 “State 
racism” offers an apt description of the relationship between 
the state and the asylum seeker. It refers to the discourse that 
creates a struggle between the race that wields power and 
defines social norms and the race that deviates from these 
norms and thereby threatens the biological identity, in other 
words the national identity, of the society.28 Asylum seekers 
fall into this latter category. As non-citizens who enter the 
state to demand rights and recognition, they are deviants and 
constitute an invasion of the pure space of the nation. Racism 
functions to divide the population into those who the state 
must protect and nurture—the People—and those who can 
be detained, placed outside the law and exposed to death in 
order for the People to live, that is, to exist as more than just 
a collection of individuals.29 This division of the population 
is part of the discourse of national security. The mantra of 
war—for the People to live, the other must die—becomes 
the mantra that the other must disappear or be excluded in 
order for the purity, vitality, and security of the People to 
be upheld.30 Under the auspices of biopower, both internal 
and external security practices concentrate increasingly 
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on “the enemy within,” who is generally equated with the 
unwanted immigrant, the outsider who is also an insider.31 
That the state cannot achieve complete control over entry to 
its territory is not important to its security efforts, which are 
more concerned with creating and protecting the national 
border.32 While British asylum policy proposes to achieve 
a completely airtight state border, this is generally admit-
ted to be impossible and even, from an economic point of 
view, given the reliance of the economy on illegal migrant 
labour, undesirable.33 What this policy achieves with great-
est effect is the division of the population within the state. 
The continued transgression of the territorial border is, in 
fact, necessary to the security project from which the state 
draws legitimacy, as it creates “the enemy within.”34
The discourse of threat to, and protection of, a distinct 
national identity is present in the text of British border 
policy. The new policy direction for 2007 is described, for 
example, as “building progressively to a robust, secure, risk-
based system of identity management” in order to “safe-
guard people’s identity and the privileges of citizenship.”35 
Management of the border between the British identity and 
other identities, in order to determine who belongs and who 
does not, is a central element of British policy initiatives ori-
ented towards the protection of the nation. This management 
will occur as part of the National Identity System, through 
the use of biometric identity documents, which are central 
to the modern biopolitical project. These will be phased in 
over the next few years to function as internal borders. They 
will be checked by employers, government agencies, govern-
ment service providers, and police—who are increasingly 
making use of mobile biometric readers to determine from 
people’s fingerprints whether they are illegal.36 Biometric 
technologies resolve the problem of practically identify-
ing the enemy/other, which, in multi-ethnic states, can no 
longer be done on the basis of observable characteristics. 
They also hide their discriminatory function behind an 
objective, technological face.37
The politics of division is also evident in the dichotomy 
that is established in British policy documents to separate the 
good migrant—a source of benefit for the British nation—
and the bad migrant—a source of harm. This language 
appears, for example, in a statement made by the then Home 
Secretary, Charles Clarke, which reads: “we need to ensure 
that we let in migrants with the skills and talents to benefit 
Britain, while stopping those trying to abuse our hospitality 
and place a burden on our society ….”38 The dichotomy gen-
erally appears in a form that explicitly links the good migrant 
with legality, vital economic contributions, and tax support 
for the welfare system, and the bad migrant with illegality, 
fraud, abuse of the welfare system, a flood of un-British val-
ues, organized international crime, and terrorism—in other 
words, with threat to the population.39 In the words of a 
Refugee Council report, a constructed link between asylum 
seekers and negative subjectivities, particularly that of the 
terrorist, has helped to create a community of fear willing 
to respond to the asylum seeker through harsher, excep-
tional measures.40 The linkage of the asylum seeker to nega-
tive subjectivities makes the asylum seeker distinctly other 
and provides a generically threatening identity that can be 
called to mind whenever one is forced to remember him/
her. Hiding the asylum seeker beneath these negative cat-
egories is a necessary feature of state racism because in “the 
grammar of the biopolitical, ‘one not only forgets the face of 
the other, but one must also forget that one has forgotten.’”41 
The asylum seeker is turned into a generic symbol of threat, 
without individual subjectivity and so without a face that 
could be forgotten.
The corollary of creating an other that can legitimately 
be subjected to the sovereign power to “make die” is the 
creation of the nation as a unified, distinct entity that can, 
and should, be protected. Defined in terms of explicit rules 
and associated values, the state has only a thin identity, one 
into which outsiders could integrate with relative ease. The 
national identity, based on myths of historical continuity 
and familial bonds, gives the state a thicker identity and 
thereby draws a reassuring dividing line between inside and 
outside.42 The character of this identity escapes the need 
for definition, standing in relief against an outside threat. 
Moreover, discord and conflict, including that which is 
authored by the state under the auspices of “exception,” are 
exported to the outside, onto such externalizable bodies as 
the asylum seeker.43 Jef Huysmans explains that existential 
threats are part of a “peculiar process of constituting a polit-
ical community of the established that seeks to secure unity 
and identity by instituting existential insecurity.”44 This 
process is underscored when the security measures taken in 
response to the threat from outside are themselves written 
into the text of the national identity. In a speech delivered by 
Liam Byrne, Minister of State for Immigration, Citizenship 
and Nationality, in June 2007, the National Identity System 
is said to be the modern equivalent of the nineteenth cen-
tury railways and twentieth century national grid—a pub-
lic good that will quickly weave its way into the nature of 
British life.45
A Blurring of Boundaries
The reconciliation of the contradiction between biopower 
and sovereign power is fragile and imperfect. A suspicion 
of the potential universality of the sovereign power to make 
die, in other words of the state of exception, raises its head 
as soon as this power is seen to be exercised, as in the case 
of asylum.
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The exercise of sovereign power through the state of 
exception has traditionally existed, generally in times of war, 
as the temporally and spatially bounded legal suspension of 
all specific laws, in order to preserve the nation from what 
is identified as an existential threat.46 For asylum seekers, 
this state is permanent, meaning that the state of exception is 
always present in democratic political spaces. It both bolsters 
the continuity of these spaces and the interests they support, 
and poses a permanent threat to their vitality by standing 
as their contradiction.47 The possibility of suspending the 
law indefinitely points in the direction of Agamben’s warn-
ing that the exception has spilled over spatial and temporal 
boundaries to become the rule.48 That the exercise of sover-
eign power is constantly required in order for the normalcy it 
protects to exist means that this power is always in the back-
ground and that citizens themselves are in some way subject 
to it, as well as being party to its exercise. It suggests that 
citizens are objects of sovereign biopower first, only given 
the identity and rights of the citizen second.49 If this is true, 
then citizens are in an insecure position that is the mirror 
image of that of the asylum seeker. Biometrics point to this 
conclusion. They are not used only to divide authentic from 
“fraudulent” asylum seekers, but to manage all identities, 
dividing authentic from inauthentic, such that the politics 
of asylum could be described as “writ large.”50 The nation 
and the outside inevitably cross into one another. The “space 
between discourses of belonging and unbelonging blurs, one 
bleeds into the other, and the logic that informs dichotomous 
hierarchies of being is exposed for what it is: an alibi for the 
legitimacy of the project of sovereignty.”51
The contradiction between the sovereign and biopolitical 
powers exercised by the state and the omnipresence of sover-
eign power become evident as soon as the asylum seeker 
who is subject to the power to make die is recognized. This 
recognition is inhibited, however, by the nature of spaces of 
exception themselves, discussed in the following sections, 
which work to remove the asylum seeker from the political 
space of the nation and therefore to assert state control over 
political space and render asylum seekers invisible.
Capturing Political Space in the State of Exception
The asylum seeker unsettles the trinity of territory, state, 
and nation, which describes the political geography of the 
nation-state system,52 by entering the territory of the state 
despite being prevented from entering the nation and by 
demanding entry to the nation by right and thereby acting 
as a sovereign body within a territory presumed to belong 
solely to a sovereign state. This trinity is reasserted through 
a national security discourse.
There is a feedback function between security discourses 
and understandings of political space and subjectivity. The 
former only make sense in terms of the latter, but the latter 
relies on the former in order to be reproduced as necessary 
and normal. Security crises are mobilized in the capture of 
political space,53 as is visible in the security discourse sur-
rounding asylum in Britain. However, in the exercise of state 
power to define the nature of political space can be seen 
both the power of the state and the instability of its pro-
ject. Foucault describes this project as one side of a war that 
permanently divides society in two. The political organiza-
tion of society is underwritten by relations of war, whereby 
some are able to “defend their victory and perpetuate it by 
subjugating others.”54 This war is a struggle not for domina-
tion, but to assert political reality.55 The creation of a state of 
exception, to which asylum seekers can be relegated, defends 
the victory of the sovereign nation-state in the determina-
tion of political reality; however simultaneously reveals that 
the shape of political space is contestable.
The “Outside” Inside the State
As, in Barry Buzan’s terms, a securitized issue, asylum policy 
is moved out of the public realm of political debate and is 
constituted instead as an area of existential threat that calls 
for actions not subject to public questioning or even to pub-
lic sight, in other words, actions that occur in an exceptional 
space.56 This move functions to exclude asylum seekers, but 
also to (re)constitute a certain vision of political space.
The space of exception refers to any space in which the 
ordinary rule of law has been suspended.57 It exists at the 
limit of the state—simultaneously excluded from and cap-
tured by it. Inside-outside distinctions are made ambigu-
ous in the space of exception, which in fact depends on 
this ambiguity to create a twilight quality that permits the 
impermissible and renders anomalies to the nation-state 
system invisible, or at least indistinct. In this space, the law 
applies in not applying. It is in this form, as pure law, that 
it has the greatest force. To be faced with pure law is to be 
faced with the endless potentiality of the law such that any-
thing can happen without a law being broken—it is to be 
faced with sovereign power.58 Asylum seekers are excluded 
from the space in which the legal rights of citizens operate 
as a check on state power. Britain deals with asylum seekers 
through a separate set of rules, which are subject to indefin-
ite change as new policy documents are released, although 
some of the harshest policy decisions are occasionally ruled 
against by the courts.59
The state of exception does not only manifest as a space 
in which anything can happen, but also as a space that must 
remain excluded and invisible in order to exist. Physical and 
emotional distance must be created between citizens and 
asylum seekers in order to regulate the boundaries of inside-
outside and normal-exceptional. This distance is established 
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through moves that take place in, and create, the state of 
exception. Paramount among these is the detention of asy-
lum seekers in centres that are remote and prison-like and 
that place a physical wall between these asylum seekers and 
the British people.60 They form part of the internal border of 
the nation. Importantly, detention centres also function to 
augment the image of the asylum seeker as criminal, which 
is sometimes exacerbated by the practice of handcuffing 
asylum seekers in public.61 Such moves serve to cement a 
relationship of fear and difference, setting up physical and 
psychological boundaries to encounter and making the state 
of exception seem necessary while causing what happens 
within it to disappear.
Detention centres are paradigmatic examples of spaces 
of exception. They house thousands of asylum seekers 
waiting for their claims to be processed or waiting to be 
deported—a wait that is indefinite, sometimes amount-
ing to eighteen months or more.62 Detention centres oper-
ate like prisons, making use of solitary confinement, strip 
searches, and a general atmosphere of punishment, but 
without the safeguards of prisons, lacking the suicide pre-
vention strategy of the prison system, having lower health 
care standards, and falling largely under private sector 
control.63 The use of detention in Britain has been heav-
ily criticized for infringing on human rights and failing to 
meet British standards of lawful detention, and has suffered 
a series of scandals, including riots, accusations of abusive 
treatment, and suicides.64 Recently, there were disturbances 
at the Harmondsworth and Campsfield detention centres. 
Detainees engaged in hunger strikes and, at Campsfield, 
fires were lit and several among those detained escaped.65 
The exceptional treatment to which asylum seekers are sub-
ject can also be seen, more generally, in the fast-tracking of 
claims presumed to be unfounded, which denies the right 
to an in-country appeal, the poor quality of decisions, the 
absence of judicial oversight of the decision to detain an 
asylum seeker, which can be based on random selection 
and the number of spaces available in detention centres, 
the curtailment of publicly funded legal aid, and the lim-
ited access asylum seekers have to information about their 
case or about any legal recourse open to them.66 A space of 
exception is also evident in the underground lives of failed 
asylum claimants who are not detained and who have not 
signed up for voluntary return. These people are cut off from 
access to welfare support, as well as being denied the legal 
right to work, and end up destitute or working in poor con-
ditions in the underground economy.67 The use of biometric 
identification will mean that these people, who have often 
lived in Britain for years, will face the omnipresent risk of 
being picked up off the street, out of schools, or at work to be 
detained and deported. Pushing these bodies to the limit of 
political space, into the realm of the exception, contains the 
outside inside the state and serves to re-establish the split in 
the population between those of the nation and those not of 
the nation.
Along with internal bordering mechanisms that establish 
spaces of exception within the state, Britain has expressed 
an interest in creating external spaces of exception that 
would be even less visible. In 2003, Britain proposed that 
the UNHCR, together with the EU, establish “Regional 
Protection Areas,” which would be set up in unstable areas to 
provide protection for fleeing populations, and “off-territory 
Transit Processing Centres” outside EU borders, where asy-
lum seekers would be detained and their claims processed, 
although the proposal for the latter has since been dropped. 
Both would remove the asylum seeker from the territory of 
the state, where it is difficult to render them, and the practi-
ces used to exclude them, entirely invisible.68
The pervasive use of exceptional measures has become 
necessary in order to defend the conception of political 
space that links state, nation, and territory to form an inter-
national state system that divides the world into exclusive 
political units. “The camp [the space in which the exception 
becomes the rule] is the fourth, inseparable element that has 
now added itself to—and so broken—the old trinity com-
posed of the state, nation (birth), and land.”69 It serves to 
reconstitute the link between state, nation, and territory 
by containing the residual to the political system this link 
describes; however it also upsets this link by showing its 
imperfection. The space of exception exists, therefore, as a 
site of “dislocating localization” at the heart of the state.70
The Instability of the Sovereign Project
While it defends the sovereignty of the international state 
system, the state of exception also functions as a site of resist-
ance to it.71 It demonstrates the need for a defense, indicates 
the existence of conceptions of political space different from 
those that are “sovereign,” and exposes the sovereign state 
that uses exceptional measures to the risk of being accused 
of criminal actions.
Sovereignty is supposed to go unquestioned, therefore 
defending it points to its vulnerability. The efficacy of a 
defense of sovereignty, which occurs through the labour 
of marginalizing anomalies, relies on its being forgotten.72 
While rationality is built up on top of the violence and con-
tradictions that characterize exceptional measures, making 
them forgettable, it forms an imperfect cover. As it constructs 
justifications that explain increasingly harsh measures and 
that take it further from this discord, this rationality gets 
“more and more fragile, more and more wicked, more and 
more bound up with illusions, chimeras, and mystifica-
tion.”73 In the almost hysterical harshening of border and 
 Contesting the Shape of Political Space 
127
Refuge26-1.indd   127 8/13/10   9:10:22 PM
asylum policy in Britain, desperation seems to take the place 
of control. The more severe the measures taken, the more 
obvious and graceless the effort to capture political space 
becomes.
Crisis situations are the foil against which the stability 
and desirability of normalcy are thrown into relief, and 
yet they challenge the permanence of normalcy by being 
pointed to as a crisis, an exception. They highlight what does 
not fit into dominant discourses and therefore indicate the 
possibility of conceptualizing political space and subjectiv-
ity in different ways. In other words, the “state of emergency 
is also always a state of emergence.”74 The state’s decision 
to approach the entry of asylum seekers into the state as a 
crisis, calling for exceptional measures, indicates that asy-
lum seekers are aberrations to the normal order of politics 
and therefore necessarily pose a challenge to the sovereignty 
of the nation-state. Exceptional spaces themselves act as 
aberrations, or exceptions, such that “a system of sover-
eign, contiguous, discrete, and exclusive nation-states” is no 
longer a perfectly apt description of global political space, if 
it ever was.75 They are the outside inside the state.76
Spaces of exception are not only damaging to the asylum 
seekers placed within them, but also to the policy makers 
who put them there. Agamben writes that the Sovereign 
itself exists in a permanent state of exception. That the 
sovereign state is the maker of laws places it, paradoxically, 
both inside and outside the law. The state declares the law 
to be absolute and yet has the power to suspend it, to decide 
on the exception.77 By creating an exception in which poli-
cies of indefinite detention and forced deportation become 
possible, the state goes outside the law and therefore risks 
being branded as criminal just as the asylum seeker has 
been branded by the state.78 This kind of challenge is seen in 
the literature and protests of organizations that work with 
asylum or human rights related issues.79 While the balance 
is tipped in favour of the legitimacy of the state’s actions 
with regards to asylum seekers, this challenge draws atten-
tion to the contentious nature of these actions and threatens 
to damage their legitimacy.
While the state of exception channels an exercise of 
power that aims to concretize the boundaries of sovereign 
political space, it creates a space on the periphery that chal-
lenges the state even as it asserts its authority, that is nei-
ther outside nor inside, legal nor illegal, with those inside 
it caught between entry and exit, and so effectively helps to 
disorder these boundaries.80 In the disorder caused by the 
state of exception, the nation-state is revealed as a contest-
able unit of political space, lacking ontological status and 
existing only, albeit compellingly, in the acts that constitute 
and defend its reality.81
Interrupting Sovereign Stories: From Homo Sacer 
to Political Agent
Removed from the national space in which voices can be 
heard and political interaction is possible, asylum seekers 
are inhibited from acting as political agents; however even 
from within this space of exception, they are able to assert 
their presence and to issue a challenge to the traditional 
structure of international political space.
Homo Sacer
The asylum seeker who is banned from political space to a 
space of exception can be described as homo sacer, or bare 
life, a life that can be killed without homicide being com-
mitted.82 Bare life is life stripped of all identity except that of 
being human. As such, it is de-subjectified, without political 
identity, rights, or agency. “Just as the law, in the sovereign 
exception, applies to the exceptional case in no longer apply-
ing … so homo sacer … is included in the community in the 
form of being able to be killed.”83 The asylum seeker, as bare 
life, is an object of unease and subject of repression.
The concept of national sovereignty locates sovereignty 
in the life of the citizen. This location of sovereignty rests 
on a fiction that joins birth to entry into the nation, such 
that there is no separation between the two concepts. This 
means that the human becomes “the immediately vanish-
ing ground (who must never come to light as such) of the 
citizen” such that human rights become citizen rights.84 
Asylum seekers, unless they are made invisible, make this 
fiction obvious.85 While held up as threats to national secur-
ity, the fear that attaches to them runs deeper. In existing as 
bare life, they demonstrate the vulnerability and rightless-
ness of the human and cause those within the nation to cling 
more tightly to the assurance of their citizenship. Asylum 
seekers exist in the in-between of political space; shadow 
figures that are inhibited from taking shape as legitimate 
political agents until they re-enter the category of citizen—
the only category of political subjectivity that is typically 
recognized.86
Placing certain bodies, as bare life, in a relation of excep-
tion with the state functions to ban them from speaking 
and acting politically.87 Their presence as political subjects 
seeking asylum is denied such that stories matching the cit-
izen to the human can ring out clearly. They are described 
out of existence and a different script—of lawlessness and 
trickery—is spoken for them. Citizenship is not only a legal 
category. It is also defined in terms of certain practices 
or modes of being.88 Spaces of exception work to prevent 
asylum seekers from displaying these modes of being—
including belonging to a community or contributing to 
economic processes within the state, making rights claims, 
and engaging in political speech—by rendering them silent, 
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invisible, and isolated. The violence of exclusion and excep-
tion is itself made less visible by the fact that those who 
already, in a way, do not exist cannot be excluded or sub-
ject to exceptional treatment. When rendered subjectless 
and voiceless, the asylum seeker’s exposure to suffering also 
becomes invisible and meaningless.89 Under the rubric of 
exception, the British state cannot be responsible for homi-
cide, violence, or even complicity in a death brought about 
by suicide. The logic of the sovereign ban consists of “the 
permissible violent inscription of sovereignty on the bodies 
of those who have been reduced to bare life … [those who] 
are present, but their presence is absence.”90
The movements and claims of asylum seekers can only 
be fit into the map of the international state system by being 
forced to disappear as bare life behind a discourse of threat. 
Treated as bare life, however, asylum seekers are turned 
into symbols of the vulnerability of life under the rule of 
the sovereign and of the violence on which the sovereign 
political order rests. To the extent that asylum seekers resist 
attempts to isolate and silence them, this vulnerability and 
violence become difficult to ignore.
Claiming Voice
Sovereign power is the power of capture—the capture, inter-
nalization, and domestication of what already exists.91 It 
must always contend with the danger that what is captured 
will speak with its own voice and be heard. The bodies of 
asylum seekers have eluded capture to some extent, carry-
ing the echo of a different politics even while they are cat-
egorized as threats, invaders, economic migrants, victims, 
or potential-citizens in an attempt to fit them into the nar-
ratives of the sovereign state. The asylum seeker is created 
through the conceptual work of categorizing, or boundary-
drawing, but is simultaneously redrawing these boundaries. 
The very presence of the asylum seeker rendered as bare life 
speaks a challenge, stretching the bounds of political sub-
jectivity. It is, in fact, this “production of ‘presence’ by those 
without power” that presents the most significant challenge 
to the exclusivity of citizenship.92
Agamben’s description of bare life as lacking political 
subjectivity does not account for the politics of presence or 
the voice that breaks through the barriers of sovereign cap-
ture.93 These moments of resistance are enough to stimulate 
a sense of unease, which fuels the hysteria characteristic of 
public discourse about asylum seekers. Trapped in a space of 
exception, bare, physical life can itself become a ground for 
political communication, as seen, for example, in the fifty-
six or more suicides committed by asylum seekers detained 
in Britain since 1990 and, at the time of writing, occurring 
at a rate of one a month, the numerous hunger strikes held 
by detainees protesting the conditions of detention centres, 
the riots involving burned buildings and escapes, which 
turn invisible bodies into actively fleeing bodies, or the pro-
test of a detained asylum seeker who sutured shut his eyelids 
and lips.94 Different stories can be inscribed on these events, 
however stories of deviance and delinquency begin to ring 
hollow as the number of instances—in which the bare life 
of asylum seekers is turned into a symbol of protest, often 
echoed by an outcry from human rights groups—mounts. 
The subjectivity of the other cannot be completely erased. 
It rises through the threatening identity painted over it, 
evidence of the exceptional measures used against it. In 
asserting agency in the form of protest, those who are not 
citizens, and who are therefore not recognized as political 
agents, claim the subjectivity of the citizen and thereby put 
pressure on the boundaries of citizenship.95
When the subjectivity of asylum seekers is made vis-
ible, their decision to move, or “escape,” emerges as a direct 
critique of the divisions of international political space.96 
Moreover, their suffering and protest within the state they 
have escaped to takes flight as a cry against the continuous, 
violent capture of political space by the state, which ren-
ders their escape meaningless. An encounter between cit-
izens and asylum seekers then becomes difficult to avoid, as 
does the challenge asylum seekers pose. It is always through 
encountering the other that we learn about the stories we 
exist within. As Étienne Balibar writes, “even as they are 
‘from elsewhere,’ [they] are also completely ‘from here.’” 
They are “today’s proletarians.”97
The movement of asylum seekers across borders can be 
understood as an ontological activity.98 It draws the self and 
other into a meeting, which is the basic moment in which 
new possibilities of being, or of seeing the self and the other, 
are formed. Their bodies push against the traditional, sover-
eign shapes of political space as they move through and 
between them. Along with the movement of these bodies, 
sovereign political space and the citizen also move.99 This 
meeting of self and other is currently characterized by ban-
ishment and exception, which places the sovereign state 
and the citizen in a strained position of contradiction. The 
“imperatives of the political imaginary of the British state 
… are concluded in a narrative that holds the line, so to 
speak, that holds the one who seeks refuge over the hor-
izon, literally and figuratively. It desires a narrative in which 
there is no rupture, an identity in which there is no ambi-
guity.”100 And yet the other who must be hidden in order 
for the narrative to run smoothly is always in the periph-
eral vision of those following this narrative, challenging its 
simplicity. In the presence of asylum seekers, and perhaps 
more in our response to them, the political map determined 
by sovereign biopolitical power, which counts on their dis-
appearance, begins to surface as something unstable. An 
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awareness of the contradictions and violence used to main-
tain it begins to needle at the complacency of normal life, 
shaking its foundations and its image of civility. Rendering 
life bare may, in the end, be impossible.
Sketch of a Transformed Political Order
A revision of political space that would meet the challenge 
posed by the asylum seeker is worth considering, given the 
violence and contradiction that is necessary in order for it 
to be ignored. Asylum seekers’ demands for refuge and rec-
ognition as human beings with political rights calls upon 
a conception of political space defined according to the 
principle of asylum, whose corollary must be hospitality, 
and according to the notion of human rights, which locates 
sovereignty in human life and does not define political sub-
jectivity in terms of exclusion. This rebellious discourse, like 
the sovereign discourse of the state, is not based on truth or 
right, but on its ability to convince and to capture.101 As sug-
gested in the preceding sections, the force of this discourse, 
spoken through the movements, demands, and presence of 
asylum seekers, is demonstrated by its unsettling ability to 
draw attention to the contradictions of the sovereign pol-
itical order and to create a space outside of this order that 
elicits continuous, imperfect efforts to recapture it.
The challenge posed by the asylum seeker can be elucidated 
by placing it in the context of the communitarian-cosmopol-
itan debate, which dominates discussions of whether and how 
the organization of political space should change. It is beyond 
the ambit of this paper to delve too deeply into the well-worn 
debate between the communitarian and cosmopolitan pos-
itions; however insofar as the asylum seeker challenges us to 
rethink these categories, a brief sketch, positioning the vision 
of political space suggested by the asylum seeker within this 
debate, is in order. In very rough terms, communitarianism 
captures the sentiment that states and those within them 
have a moral responsibility towards citizens before non-cit-
izens, while cosmopolitanism is based on the instinct that 
moral obligations are to all humans, regardless of citizen-
ship. The asylum seeker, in demanding the “right to have 
rights”102 by virtue of his/her humanity, represents a cosmo-
politan instinct, but in asking to enter the political commun-
ity of the state, suggests the pertinence of communitarian 
value structures as well. This ambivalence resonates with the 
pervasive sense that both arguments give voice to an import-
ant moral intuition. The demands and movements of the 
asylum seeker suggest the inadequacy of the debate between 
the poles of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. The 
challenge they pose is not an appeal for a borderless global 
community, as it is sometimes perceived to be, but rather for 
a fluid conception of community. More specifically, it seems 
to call for the denationalizing of citizenship, such that it is 
recognized to reside in anyone acting within a certain polit-
ical space.103 This call is seen in the asylum seeker’s demand 
for the state’s protection, for entry to the nation, and for the 
rights that, while termed human rights, manifest as citizen 
rights, as well as in their self-assertion as political subjects. 
Asylum seekers call for an expansion of the parameters of 
citizenship, demanding that the recognition and institution 
of citizen rights be located on the border instead of within 
it.104 In other words, they call for citizenship to be renegoti-
ated, according to the terms of hospitality, wherever a border 
is called into being to separate citizens from non-citizens, 
that is, wherever the other is encountered. Political com-
munity would thus become a continuously shifting concept, 
but inclusion would nonetheless be determined on the basis 
of concrete demands.105 This challenge is not a call to bring 
down the state, but rather to accept as normal the permanent 
uncertainty of the blurring of inside and outside and to open 
a space for a limitless proliferation of insides and outsides, of 
potential communities and sites of negotiation.106
The vision of a more inclusive and more complex map 
of political space is, in fact, emerging in spaces and under-
standings that have slid into the map of political space, chal-
lenging the absolutism of the international state system. The 
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and “Sanctuary City” initiatives, for 
example, have turned certain cities into solid representations 
of denationalized spaces in which inside-outside distinctions 
are blurred. Through these initiatives, essential services are 
provided to residents of cities by virtue of their presence, 
not their status.107 The pressure that is being exerted on the 
international political order, in the movements and claims 
of asylum seekers, is powerful and is making ambiguous 
who is inside “the boundaries of civic and moral obligation” 
and who is within the space of rights.108
This is, admittedly, a rather compressed discussion of what 
a transformation of political space, in line with the challenge 
posed by the asylum seeker, might look like. It serves, how-
ever, to illustrate that essential to this transformation would 
be the decline of the nation, which is tied to the practice 
of state racism; the adoption of a skeptical attitude towards 
the sovereignty of the international state system, tied to a 
recognition of alternative, albeit nascent, forms of political 
space and subjectivity; and the recognition of the other who 
enters the political community, and claims political voice 
within it, as a citizen. While the entirety of the vision it calls 
for may remain elusive, the challenge conveyed by asylum 
seekers shakes the legitimacy of established structures and, 
moreover, gives rise to new forms of political space and sub-
jectivity that emerge alongside and within these structures, 
denying their sovereign authority.
Volume 26 Refuge Number 1
130
Refuge26-1.indd   130 8/13/10   9:10:23 PM
Conclusion
The difficulty of controlling the movement of asylum seek-
ers and the enduring nature of the conditions that cause 
people to move across international borders mean that the 
tension between the sovereign account of the political and 
the account of the contradictions and violence of sovereign 
political space, evident in the movements of asylum seekers, 
is not about to fade. In the face of the contradiction between 
the British state’s roles of safeguarding life and of banning 
life to a space of exception, the increasing desperation of 
moves to contain the asylum seeker and assert a traditional 
view of political space, and the assertion of political pres-
ence and rights on the part of the asylum seeker, the shape of 
political space may be driven into a more inclusive form.
On the other hand, the crisis of asylum and the excep-
tional response it elicits may be drawn out far into the future; 
or in Agamben’s words, the exception may be becoming the 
rule.109 The longer it takes to turn our gaze towards this 
crisis, over which stories of necessity and legitimacy are 
being heaped, the longer the bodies of those who do not fit 
into the map of the international state system will suffer the 
violence needed to make them invisible. If we take an inter-
est in these bodies and in our own authenticity, then “it is 
precisely this topological zone of indistinction, which had 
to remain hidden from the eyes of justice, that we must try 
to fix under our gaze.”110 To gaze in this way is to acknow-
ledge and return the gaze of the asylum seeker, which con-
tains a challenge to reconceptualize political space such that 
the asylum seeker is able to enter it as one of an “us” that 
becomes unstable. While this vision of change is mythical, 
the chronically immanent question “is it possible,” which 
greets all visions of change, is increasingly becoming a ques-
tion that can be asked with regard to the continuance of the 
current ordering of political space. The violence required 
to transform what is currently normal may be less than the 
violence that is needed to sustain it.
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